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INCOME TAX EVASION: SOME AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Steven E. Crane and Farrokh Nourzad, Marquette University1 
It is well-known that every year a substan-
tial amount of income evades income taxatiop. 
This is obv ious 1 y a significant po 1 icy prob len1. 
To salve this problem, the tax authorities must 
have information about the factors that tax-
payers consider when deciding how much income t e 
report on their tax returns. The need for such 
information has prompted a number of theoretical 
and empirical studies of the evasion problem. 
In this paper sorne aggregate empirical evi-
dence on income tax evasion in the U.S. is prov-
ided. This is accomplished by specifying an 
aggregate tax evasion function which is estimated 
over the period 1947-78. The results provide (1) 
empirical evidence which supports sorne of the 
pred ict ions of the mi e rotheory, (2) ins ight s 
where the theoretical results are indeterminant, 
and (3) an indication of the sensitivity of a 
measure of aggregate evasion to changes in the 
aggregate variables which correspond to the 
microtheoretical determinants of evasion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in 
the following way. Section I contains background 
information on the results reported in sorne of 
the previous literature. In Section II, an empir-
ical model is specified and estimated, and the 
results are presented. This is followed in 
Section III by a brief discussion of sorne of the 
possible implications of these results, along 
with suggestions for further research. 
l. BACKGROUND 
Most theoretical studies in this field 
involve microeconomic models of the individual's 
income dec laration decision. Using a standard 
decision-under-uncertainty framework, most an-
alysts specify models that include four determin-
ants of optimal income tax evasion. These are the 
taxpayer's true income, his/her tax rate, the 
penalty rate to which he/she would be subjected 
if detecte~, and his/her perceived probability of 
detect ion. 
Within this common framework, analysts de-
rive comparative static results under a variety 
of assumptions concerning the factors affecting 
the evasion decision. For example, different 
assumptions are made regarding the individual 
taxpayer's attitude towards risk, and thus 
his/her objective function, the structure of the 
tax system, and the properties of the penalty and 
probability-of-detection functions. 
In general, sorne firm conclusions are 
reached about the effect on evasion of both the 
penalty rate and the probability of detection. It 
is found that higher penalty rates and higher 
probabilities of detection lead to lower evasion. 
An implication of this is that, at the margin, 
the two compliance policy tools can be considered 
substitutes for each other. Consequently, it 
should be possible to offset any fall in expected 
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tax revenue due t~ a reduction in one by 
increasing the other. 
In contrast, ambiguous results emerge from 
efforts to determine the direction of the re la-
tionship between evasion and true income. This 
proves to depend on the assumptions ma de 
regarding the factors mentioned above. For ex am-
ple, Allingham and Sandmo [1, 1972] show tha t 
with a proportional tax system, the effec t of a 
change in true income on the level of reported 
income depends upon the magnitude of the penalty 
relative to the size of unreported in come. 
Further, they demonstrate that higher income 
causes the fraction of income reported to in-
crease, decrease, or remain constant dep endi ng 
upon whether relative risk aversion incr ea ses, 
decreases, or remains constant as income 
increases. On t .he other hand, Srinivas an [14, 
1973] analyzes a risk neutral individua l co n-
fronted with a progressive tax system and fi nds 
that the result depends upon whethe r the 
probability of detection is an increasing ora 
decreasing func t ion of income. 
The theoretical work has also been inc apable 
of offering determínate results regard ing the 
relationship between the tax rate and optimal 
tax evasion. This is because a change in the tax 
rate produces incom2 and substitution ef fec ts, 
which may reinforce or oppose each other. The 
net effect depends on assumptions conc ern ing 
attitude towards risk and the penalty fun ct ion. 
As long as penalties are imposed on ev aded 
income, the substitution effect is pos i ti ve, 
meaning that higher tax rates result in increased 
evasion, other things equal. This is because an 
increase in the tax rate makes evasion mo re 
profitable on the margin. In contra st, the 
income effect can be negative, zero, or positive 
depending upon whether absolute risk aver sion iz 
decreasing, constant, or increasing with income . 
Thus, the net effect is uncertain. Fu rt her , 
Yitzhaki [17, 1974] has shown that when penalties 
are based on evaded taxes there is a ze ro 
substitution effect. In light of these diver se 
findings, no general statement can be mad e about 
the effect of the tax rate on the eva sion 
decision. 
In an effort to e lear up these ambiguit ies, 
. several empirical studies have investigated the 
responsiveness of various evasio.n meas ures to 
changes in the factors affecting the decision to 
evade. These studies, like their theo retic al 
counterparts, typically have been undert aken at 
the microeconomic level. Most of them have 
employed either a questionnaire o§ an experimen-
tal (game-simulation) approach. These stu dies 
confirm the inverse relationship between evasion 
and the two compliance variables, and tend to 
suggest direct relationships between evasion and 
both income and the tax rate. 
Other empirical research has focused primar-
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ily on the measurement of either unreporteg · between the two is a measure of unreported 
income or evaded taxes at the aggregate level. income. The Gap data used here have been 
Another procedure has been to measure the magni- adjusted to eliminate the AGI reported on nontax-
tude of tax ev as ion by a na 1 yz ing the traces it ab 1 e returns and the AG I recei ved by those who 
leaves in the economy.7 Both types of studies are not required to file or pay taxes.9 Since 
are without theoretical underpinnings and make no these individuals have no incentive to evade 
attempt to systematically analyze the factors taxes. the adjusted AGI Gap figures should be 
which affect tax evasion. more accurate estimates of the amount of 
unreported income. 
After reviewing this literature on tax eva-
don. we ha ve conc luded that there is something 
missing. To our know 1 edge, no 1 ink has be en 
estabilished between aggregate measures of 
evasion and the theoretical work analyzing 
evasion at the micro level. Clearly, the micro 
analysis is essential for understanding the 
pbenomenon of tax evasion. But it is also worth 
remembering that the policymaker's ultimate 
concern is tax evasion at the aggregate level. 
II. AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The primary determinants of income tax 
evasion as identifed in the literature cited 
above can be summarized using the following 
implicit evasion funct ion 
.O> z = f(Y, e , n, P). 
In this function, Z is unreported income, Y is 
true income, e is the margina 1 tax rate, n is the 
penalty rate, and P is the probability of 
detection. 
In order to estímate (1) at the aggregate 
leve 1, we need to spec ify it in terms of an 
empirically testable equation, and quantify its 
argumenta us ing aggregate mea sures. We begin by 
postulating the following aggregate empirical 
~vas ion equat ion 
(2) Zt ..; a 0 + a 1 lnYt + a 28 t + a3IIt + a4Pt + Ut, 
vhere all variables are as defined above, t is 
the time index, and U is the random disturbance 
term with the usua 1 interpretat ion. The income 
variable is expressed in logarithmic form in 
order to recognize the probable nonl inearity due 
to risk aversion. 
For this equation to be consistent with the 
findings of microtheory, the signs of a 3 and a4 
ehould be negative. As for the signs of a 1 and 
a2, microtheory provides no e lear expectation. 
But casual observation, recent policy discus-
eions, and some of the empirical work at the 
•~ero leve 1 might lead one to expect pos it i ve 
ngns. 
We are now in a position to relate the 
argumenta in (2) to measurab 1 e aggregates. For 
the dependent variable. Z, we use a version of 
the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap. The Gap is 
the difference between the AGI figures derived 
b~ the Bureau of Economic Ana lysis and the AGI 
(f~ure§ reported by the Internal Revenue Service llS). In effect, the Bureau AGI measures 
reportable income, while the IRS figure measures 
AGI actua 11 y reported. Thus the . difference 
It should be noted, however, that this 
measure of evasion is by no means comprehensive. 
There are many other "underground" income f 1 ows 
from criminal activity, etc. that are not in-
cluded in the AGI Gap. At best, it measures the 
amount of "above ground" income that is not 
reported. 0 
In this aggregate specification of the eva-
sien function, real personal income is used as a 
measure of true income, Y. This measure has been 
u sed, in part, because persona 1 in come is a 
better measure of true income than AGI. In 
addition, specifying income in real terms allows 
us to avoid the issue of inf lat ion.11 
There are several altern~tives for cal-
culating an aggregate proxy for the tax rate 
variable, 8. One possibility is to use an 
effective tax rate, calculated as the ratio of 
tota 1 income tax revenue to some me asure of 
income. But, as Tanzi [ 15, 1980, p. 79] points 
out, 
[a] variable thus obtained suffers 
from three shortcomings: f irst • the 
numerator of the ratio uses actual tax 
revenue rather than potential (without 
evasion) revenue. In other words, the 
ratio may be reduced by t he existence 
of e vas ion. Second • the denominator 
may have been affected by the under-
report ing of some income. Third, t he 
ratio may remain unchanged even when 
the rate structure is changing. This 
last shortcoming is perhaps the most 
serious, as it is the marginal tax rate 
on a taxpayer's income--rather than the 
average rate--that is more likely to 
determine whether he evades the tax on 
the marginal income. 
. . 
Because of these cons iderat ions, a measure 
of the effective tax rate is not used in this 
paper. Instead, we fo llow a se heme suggested by 
~right [16, 1969] to construct a weighted average 
{1argit_1a 1 tax rate ser.ie s which we ~e 1 iev e is 
s uper1or to the effect1ve tax rate. 1 As Tanzi 
[15. 1980, p. 79] puts it, "this series is 1 ike ly 
t o prov ide year1y rates that may be e loser to 
f.ome moda 1 average taxpayer's tax rate." 
We use a measure of the average cost of 
underreporting income as a proxy for the penalty 
rate, JI. The procedure used to construct this 
measure is to express the additiona1 taxes, pen-
alties. and interest assessed, as reported by the 
C o mm i s s ion e r o f t he IR S [ 6 , 1 9 4 7- 7 8 ], a s a pe r-
centage of the AGI Gap. This ratio measures the 
--------
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effective cost (pe r dollar of unreported income) The estimation resulta also ind icate t hat 
incurred by detected evaders. there is a positive relationship bet ween tax 
There are a number of problema with this 
measure. First, its numerator consista of 
assessed evasion costs rather than potential 
costs. Thus it may suffer from the same problema 
as an effective tax rate. Second, this ratio 
does not measure the statutory penalty rate, 
which is what matters to the individual taxpayer. 
Unfortunately, because statutory penalty rates 
~ary with the conditions of underrep~rting 
(failure to file, failure to pay, negl1gence, 
fraud, etc.), it is not possible to construct a 
summary series for this variable as in the case 
of the tax rate. This, coupled with the fact that 
detected evaders must not only pay penalties but 
also bear additional taxes and interest charges, 
led us to use these cost ratios. 
Finally, an econometric problem with the 
cost-of-underreport ing variable must be recog-
nized. This ratio contains the AGI Gap in the · 
denom i nator, which may introduce some simul-
taneity into the model. In recognition of this 
potent ia 1 prob 1 em, a technique suggested by 
Durbin [2, 1954] is used to generate an instru-
ment wh i ch replaces this variable in the 
equation. 
As an aggregate proxy for the probability of 
detection, P, we use the data reported in the 
Commissioner of the IRS [6, 1947-78] to construct 
a three-year moving average of the ratio of the 
number of returns examined to the number of 
returns filed. Our reasoning is that an indi-
vidual's subjective evaluation of the probability 
of be i ng detected may in part depend on whether 
or not he/she knows someone who has been audited 
in the recent past, and that this will be a 
positive function of the percentage of returns 
that were audited during the prev ious three 
years. Gi ven that sorne evaders may choose not to 
file returns at all, the denominator of this 
var i able is likely to be understated, causing P 
to ove r state the probability of detection 
somewhat. However, we believe this to be the 
best aggregate variable currently available. 
Equation (2) has been estimated over the 
per iod 1947-78 using a second-order Cochrane-
Orcutt autoregressive procedure. The fol1owing 
results (with the absolute values of the §-
stat i stics in parentheses) have been obtained.1 
z = t -52.59 + 33.439 lnYt (6.85) (13.97) + o.93o e t (6.35) 
- o .199 lit 
(2.93) 
- 1.475 pt 
(3.90) 
R2 = 0.95 " DW = 2.21 P 1 .. -0.02 P 2 • -0.56 (0.13) (3.64) 
These resulta indicate that there is a 
pos it i v e relationship between tax evasion and 
real i ncome at the aggregate level. This may be 
taken t o imply that, on the average and over the 
per iod of s t udy, absolute risk aversion has been 
a n i nc r eas i ng function of real income. 
evasion and tax rates. This can be exp lained as 
follows. Given that the subs i titution effect of 
a tax rate change is posit ive, the tot a 1 e ffect 
will depend on the sigo or the magnitude of the 
income effect. As long as the income e ffec t is 
nonnegative, i.e., absolute risk aver sion is a 
nondecreas ing func t ion of income, t h e income 
effect will be positive, reinforcing the sub-
stitution effect. On the other hand , if the 
income effect is negative, i.e., abso lute risk 
aversion decreases as income increases, the to tal 
effect of an increase in the tax rate wi1 1 be 
positive only if the substitutio n e f fect 
dominates the income effect. Of th ese, the 
possibility of a positive income e ffec t is 
consistent with the above resu 1 t that over the 
period of study there has been a diiect relat ion-
ship between tax evasion and the leve l of real 
income. 
The negative signs on the coeff icient s of 
the two po 1 icy parameters, the averag e co st of 
evasion, and the probability of detec tion, are 
in line with the predictions of t he mic ro -
theoretic mode1s. It a1so appea:rs that these twc 
po1icy tools are indeed substitute s for onl' 
another as Allingham and Sandmo [1, 197 2 ] ha v;; 
suggested. Thus there does appear to be a 1 inL 
between the predicted micro tax evasion behavior 
and the macro aggregates. 
To summarize, we find al1 variabl es in this 
empirical model to be statistica11y significant, 
and have signs that are reasonab le and consistent 
with the microtheory. In addition, the model 
explains 97% of the variation in unrep orted 
income. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In v iew of the inherent 1 im i ta t i ons of the 
data used in this study, we must exerc ise caution 
in drawing conclusions. Nevertheless, given the 
dearth of information about ta x eva sion a t the 
aggregate level, it seems appropri a t e to make 
some tentative statements. 
First, the positive relationship bet ween 
real income and underreporting sugg ests that 
evasion is a pro-cyc 1 ica1 phenomenon. This could 
be because of a change in the comp o s ition of 
income, if more easily underreportab le i ncome 
comprises a greater portian of real pers onal 
income during expansiona. But regard l e ss of the 
cause, our estimates indicate that, other t hings 
equal and on the average, a one percent inc rease 
in rea 1 income leads to an increase of more than 
$33 billion in unreported income. This probably 
overstates the situation somewhat since part of 
the increase in unreported income may be due to 
higher prices. But the high1y s ignif icant 
coefficient on real income indicates that under-
reporting increases during expansion. 
The pro-cyc 1 ica 1 response of underreporting 
appears to be strong enough that its budg etarY 
, consequences shou ld not be neg 1 ec ted. Of cour_se, 
the effect of rising underreport i n g du nng 
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ezpansio~s may very ·well be overwhelmed by th e 
¡rowth 1n revenues and the reduction in 
expenditures that typically occur during this 
phase of the business cyc le. Therefore, 
additional analysis of the income elasticities 
of government revenues and expenditures is needed 
before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Second, our resulta offer some support for 
tbe argument that cutting marginal tax rates will 
lead to greater tax revenues. This is because 
tbe tax-cut hypothes is as sumes, among other 
tbings, that tax cuts reduce evasion. According 
to our estimates, the total effect of a one 
percentage point reduction in the tax rate over 
tbe samp le per iod is to increase reported income 
by more than $900 million. However, it is 
questionable whether the resulting tax revenue 
vill be sufficient to cover the revenue loss due 
to the lower tax rate. Further, tax cuts may 
provide incentives which may lead to greater 
income growth, which may, in turn, lead to more 
evasion. Thus the support our analysis can pro-
vide for the tax-cut hypothesis is 1 imited. This 
is another area where additional research is 
called for. 
Third, the magnitudes of the coefficients on 
the two policy variables, the penalty rate and 
the probability of detection, indicate that, 
other things equal, they are far from perfect 
aubstitutes as far as revenue generation is con-
cerned. The coefficient on P is more than seven 
times that of II. According to our estimates, a 
one percentage point increase in the probability 
of detection wi 11 increase reported income by 
nearly $1.5 bi 11 ion, while a one percentage point 
increase in the penalty rate will only generate 
an addit iona 1 $200 mi 11 ion of reported income. 
The _finding that increasing the audit rate 
i 8 a mor e e f fe e t i ve p o 1 i e y e a n be ex p 1 a in e d in 
·part by the fact that over the period of study 
,tbe mean value of this variable was relatively 
lov, 3.5 percent. Starting with a low P, a small 
increase will have a larger marginal impact on 
unreported incof'le than l-ncñ .._, is already 
relatively high. Moreover, it is sensible that 
high penalties coupled with low probabilities of 
detection are not strong enough deterrents. As 
lo 1m [ 8 , 1 9 7 3 , p. 2 6 6 ] p u t s i t , t h i s i s 1 i k e 
"hang[ ing] tax evaders with probabi 1 ity zero." 
On t he . o t he r han d , a h i g h proba b i 1 i t y o f 
detect ion e ven wi th low moneta ry costs may be a 
mor e e f f e e t i v e d e t erren t , par t 1 y d u e t o · 
DOnpecuniary costs as so e ia ted with prosecu t ion. 
Of course, raising the probability of detection 
through more frequent audits involves the use of 
resources, while increasing the penalty rate is 
virtually free of costs. Therefore, a complete 
aasessment of the relative effectiveness of these 
tvo policy tools must account for not only gross 
tax revenues, but also enforcement costs. 
Additiona 1 research is needed to determine this 
net return. 
Finally, our analysis has followed the 
theoretical literature and avoided the issue of 
Ínflation. The convent iona 1 wisdom is that the 
&overnment will benefit from inflation because 
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the progressive income -:t ·ax structure genera tes a 
nonlegislated tax increase. However, this 
argument would lose part of its appeal if it 
could be shown that evasion increases with 
inflation. Intuitively, inflation may generate 
an incentive to evade taxes for two reasons. 
First, inflation may cause nominal incomes to 
rise, subjecting some taxpayers to higher tax 
ratea (bracket creep). Second, inflation erodes 
the taxpayer's purchasing power and thus reduces 
his/her standard of living. As far as we know, 
only F ishburn [3, 1981] has made a pre 1 iminary 
attempt to explicitly incorporate inflation into 
the standard evasion model. We believe that this 
is an interesting and important issue that is 
deserving of additional theoretical and empirical 
analysis. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. We wish to thank an anonymous referee 
and the editor for their helpful comments. 
2. Se e, for examp 1 e, A 11 ingham and Sandmo 
[1, 1972], Srinivasan [14, 1973] and Yitzhaki 
[17, 1974]. Other factors, not shared by all 
models include the taxpayer's sex, age, 
education, marital status, etpnic background, 
and the perceived inequality in the fiscal 
system, to name a few. 
3. For criticism of this proposition, see 
Kolm [8, 1973]. 
4. See Allingham and Sandmo [1, 1972]. 
Note, however, that in their model the choice 
variable is the level of reported income rather 
than unreported income or evaded taxes. Thus, 
they find that the substitution effect is 
negative and the income effect is positive, zero, 
or negative depending upon whether absolute risk 
aversion is decreasing, constant, or increasing 
with income. 
5. See, for instance, Friedland, Maital, and 
Rutenberg [5, 1978], Mork [10, 1975], Spicer and 
Becker [ 12, 1980], and Spicer and Lundstedt [ 13, 
1976]. 
6. See, for instance, Long [9, 1980], and 
Park [11, 1981]. These approaches are surveyed 
and critically evaluated by Frey and Pommerehne 
[4, 1982]. 
7. See, for instance, Tanzi [15, 1980]. 
8. The BEA derives its AGI figures by 
adjusting Personal Income for the conceptual 
differences between Persona 1 and Adjusted Gross 
Income. This is necessary because each measure 
contains items that the other omits. Of course, 
imperfections in the data mean that this residual 
probably measures more than evaded income. But 
after surveying the available data, we concluded 
that the AGI Gap was the most appropriate measure 
for our purposes. 
9. This adjustment was made by Long [9, 
1980, p. 108]. Long's data were through 1977. 
The 1978 figure has been extrapolated. The 
resulta reported here are not materially affected 
by this procedure. 
10. The Gap and other measures of tax 
evasion are described and critically evaluated by 
Frey and Pommerhene [4, 1982]. 
11. Little is known about the effect of 
inflation on tax evasion. Almost all of the 
theoretical work has avoided the issue. To date, 
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the only theoretica 1 work in this ar-ea há" be en ' : 1 8. KOLM, S. 'A Note on Optimum Tax Evasi on ," 
preliminary effort by Fishburn [3, 1981]. J. of Pub. Econ., 1973, 2, pp. 265-70 . 
12. The tax rates are constructed from the 
data in the IRS [7, 1947-78]. 
13. We have also estimated the tax evasion 
function using a double-log, a semi-1og with logs 
on the righthand side, a semilog with the log on · 
the lefthand side, and a pure1y linear functional 
form. The signa and significance ~f the 
estimated coefficients are generally consistent 
across these functional forms, although there is 
the expected variation in the magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients. 
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